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FOREWORD
The American military’s mission in Iraq required
the Army at large and units and Soldiers across the
force to apply a variety of creative problem-solving
skills and resourcefulness as the Army adapted to the
harsh conditions of a counterinsurgency campaign in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Out of the necessity to adapt
in order to defeat the insurgents in Iraq, our Army
evolved continuously on the battlefield, effecting radical changes in doctrine, organizations, training, and
materiel, while achieving a synergistic effect greatly
enabling our success. Scanning to determine the Army’s proper role as part of the future force has been a
popular subject of discussion among think tanks, military strategists, and pundits in recent months. The author outlines several of the popular schools of thought
and articulates cogent arguments as to why the Army
of the future must be prepared to fight our nation’s
wars across the entire spectrum of conflict. As we look
to the role the Army will play in the future, it is essential that we look back to that adaptation in the sands
of Iraq to determine what contributed to the successful conclusion of our mission there. American military
history is fraught with examples of failing to apply
the lessons of the previous fight to guide adaptation
of the institutional Army so that the hard earned lessons of the past war are applied to minimize future
costs in terms of men and materiel. Especially as the
Army faces significant budgetary cuts in light of the
fiscal austerity of the present, it is vital that we analyze the success of efforts to defeat the insurgents in
Iraq utilizing all of the instruments of national power;
and to make recommendations for competencies and
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capabilities necessary in the institutional Army along
the problem-solving construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, and
Facilities. In doing so we will help to ensure that the
adaptations made to win in Iraq are not lost and that
the Army will be better prepared for victory in future
counterinsurgency campaigns.
This Paper takes a vital first step in analyzing some
of the most important adaptations that the Army undertook over the past 10 years of conflict. As such, it
endeavors to recommend how these changes—while
still fighting a tenacious and vicious enemy—can and
should inform future adaptations in the institutional
Army in order to preclude the necessity of relearning these same lessons 10 or 20 years down the road.
Acknowledging the fiscal constraints of the current
budget crisis, the author makes sound recommendations on changes to doctrine, education, and training to better preserve the experience and knowledge
earned through sweat and blood in the sands of Iraq.
The Paper includes recommendations for overhauling
our defense acquisition processes, including preservation of existing equipment so vital in the prosecution
of the counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq, and makes
recommendations for organizational changes to retain
the strength of the whole of government expertise developed in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The research behind this Paper is, in part, the
product of the author’s personal experience in Iraq
while deployed on three tours of duty in Operations
Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn. Additional research
was conducted under the auspices of the Strategic
Research Paper requirement as part of the author’s
completion of studies at the U.S. Army War College.
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It is an example of the expertise and insight our field
grade military leaders can offer the defense community through the Strategic Studies Institute.
			

			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The U.S. Army goes to great lengths to capture
lessons learned and preserve these lessons for current practitioners and future generations. Though the
Army is one of the most self-critical organizations
found in American society, a well-deserved reputation
has also been earned for failing to inculcate those lessons by transforming the institutional Army. Change
is achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptive
innovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq,
out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic enemy, the Army transformed on the battlefield with
radical changes in doctrine, organization, training,
and materiel, which significantly enabled battlefield
success.
Writing as forces were withdrawing from Iraq at
the end of 2011, the author analyzes the success of
the military’s counterinsurgency strategy and nationbuilding efforts, examines the future of combat which
the Army may face in order to recommend a suitable
force posture, and makes recommendations for future
competencies and capabilities utilizing the problemsolving construct of Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel,
and Facilities in order to ensure future victories in this
relevant component of the full spectrum of conflict.
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BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD:
INSTITUTIONAL ARMY TRANSFORMATION
FOLLOWING VICTORY IN IRAQ
Following its successful execution of counterinsurgency strategy and nation-building in Iraq, the U.S.
Armed Forces have valuable lessons to capture and
apply to the institutional army in order to enable victory in similar future conflicts. The U.S. military, particularly the general purpose forces, historically have
paid scant attention to stability operations and counterinsurgency strategy, often viewing these as beyond
the scope of their primary responsibilities, a less desirable form of conflict, or a lesser included subset of
major conventional warfare. The military’s experience
and unique challenges in Iraq revealed otherwise. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated that stability
operations, by their very nature, are complex, messy,
require significant resolve and adaptability, and necessitate a whole of government approach to leverage
all of the instruments of national power toward the
common goal. Adhering to the aphorism that those
who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat
it, this paper first assesses the probability that the
Army will face a counterinsurgency and requirement
for nation-building again in the future and, based on
this assessment, discusses the four prevalent schools
of thought on the appropriate force posture for the
Army. Second, this paper highlights the shift to counterinsurgency strategy during the conflict in Iraq and
the primary conclusions to be garnered from success
there, with particular emphasis on the importance
of applying all of the instruments of national power
to attack the root causes of the insurgency and bolster governmental legitimacy. Finally, accepting that
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one cannot rule out stability operations as a probable
and difficult form of conflict in the future, this paper
makes recommendations for taking the next step to
institutionalize lessons learned from the Iraqi experience by transforming the institutional Army, along the
problem-solving construct of Doctrine, Organizations,
Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), in order to ensure
that stability operations and counterinsurgency warfare retain their rightful place in the full spectrum of
conflict, and that the Army remains ready and trained
to defend the nation and its interests as directed by the
national command authority.1
ARMY ADAPTATION
Recognizing that as a learning organization, it must
critically analyze the lessons from its successes and
failures in Iraq, the Army has undergone significant
reviews and analyses over the last few years. With
the objective of ensuring that the hard-earned lessons
of the battlefield in Iraq are not lost, the Army must
determine how these lessons inform change in the institutional Army. Unconventional warfare in the form
of counterinsurgencies, terrorism, and guerilla warfare is here to stay and nostalgia for simpler forms of
conventional war will not place the Army in the best
position for what will most likely be the next conflict.2
As military professionals, one must look to the future
and properly assess the emerging character of war. In
a speech to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, New
York, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said “We
can’t know with absolute certainty what the future of
warfare will hold, but we do know it will be exceedingly complex, unpredictable, and unstructured.”3
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Currently, few, if any, potential peer competitors
exist in the world which can match the U.S. Army conventionally on the battlefield; furthermore, the rise of
a peer competitor in land warfare remains unlikely in
the next couple of decades. Just as the Army draws
lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so do
America’s adversaries. The key admonition from the
100-hour war in Operation DESERT STORM and the
initial ground invasion in Iraq in 2003 is that no one
can match the U.S. Army in a conventional ground
war. The technological overmatch combined with
lightning fast tactics and proficiency in maneuver warfare, complemented by responsive and overwhelming
air power, leave virtually any antagonist considering
a conventional war with the United States in doubt
as to their chances of victory. The type of long wars
seen in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade
have, however, taught America’s adversaries that
the United States can be challenged and potentially
defeated in what Mao Tse-Tung dubbed “protracted
warfare.” The American people do not have patience
for long wars. Indeed, the endurance that the United
States has shown over the last decade is very atypical of the American record in support for wars and is
unlikely to be repeated in the future. Consequently,
warfare in the future is far more likely to be irregular.4
Enemies will seek to match strength against weakness
and will try to draw the United States into a protracted war they know the American people are less likely
to support than shorter conventional conflict, and that
the current military structure and institutions are less
prepared to dominate.
The Army’s remarkable adaptation to conduct
counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last several years has successfully pulled
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victory from the jaws of defeat.5 As Gates aptly stated,
“the Army’s ability to learn and adapt in recent years
allowed us to pull Iraq from the brink of chaos in
2007, and over the past year, to roll back the Taliban
from their strongholds in Afghanistan.”6 The wealth
of experience and the lessons of conducting stability
operations and successful counterinsurgency strategy in these two countries have embedded in the
Army’s collective psyche the skills necessary to master this difficult form of warfare. As the Army withdraws all major combat troops from Iraq at the end of
2011, declaring success and turning over the fight to
capable and well-trained Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
the Army must analyze its successes and failures and
draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the campaign.7 The adaptation on the ground in Iraq against
a dynamic threat succeeded but required the use of
all of the elements of national power, something that
required great effort and adaptation for the Army on
the ground to fully embrace.
In the introduction to his paper on finding balance in U.S. military strategy, William Flavin cites two
historical examples of successful adaptation by land
forces in contact with an enemy they did not expect to
fight: the British Army fighting the French and Indians in North America in the mid-18th century, and the
U.S. Army fighting the Viet-Cong and North Vietnamese Army in Vietnam in the late 1960s. In both cases, he
praises the successful transformation of these armies
in evolving their doctrine, tactics, training, organizations, and equipment to win tactically on the field of
battle against an asymmetric enemy. However, the
more pertinent lesson to be drawn from these historical examples is evident in how both of these Armies
“driven by ideological, fiscal and political necessity,”
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reverted back to default standards of doctrine, organization, equipping, and training its forces in the years
following the conflicts.8
In order to codify recent, crucial adaptations, the
Army must properly assess the lessons from the fights
of the last decade, commit to maintain this full spectrum capability and ensure that appropriate changes
in the institutional Army occur to avoid repeating the
mistakes previously described. A necessary precursor
to any effort to transform the institutional Army requires a determination of future threats, requirements
and capabilities and what is economically feasible in
an era of fiscal austerity.
THE FOUR SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ON
POSTURING THE FUTURE FORCE
In an Armed Forces Journal article, Frank G. Hoffman outlined four competing schools of thought
on the future of armed conflict and how the Army
should be structured to handle that conflict.9 These
schools of thought are pertinent to the discussion of
how to transform the institutional Army because the
anticipated operating environment should drive the
requirements, capabilities sought, and requisite adaptation.10
Proponents of the first school of thought, dubbed
the ”Counterinsurgents,” believe that the fight the
Army finds itself engaged in today in Iraq and Afghanistan, “represent(s) far more than a passing blip in the
evolution of conflict . . . [and] contend that massed formations comprised of traditional arms and large-scale
conflict between conventional powers is not a realistic planning scenario.”11 Counterinsurgents contend
that the likely challenges of the future will be failed
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or failing states, transnational threats, and radicalized
extremists.12 Insightfully, advocates of this school of
thought argue that the purpose of a military is not to
“perpetuate preferred paradigms, [but instead] . . . to
prepar[e] for likely contingencies and secur[e] America’s interests.”13 Counterinsurgents fear that much as
it did following the Vietnam War, the Army will likely
revert to the default position of preparing for major
combat operations (MCO) to the exclusion of stability operations, or as it is now known, Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction operations (SSTR).
Though possible, a return to an exclusive focus on
major combat operations is improbable, at least in the
near future, as there are stark differences between the
aftermath of Vietnam and Iraq. First and foremost,
most acknowledge that following the withdrawal of
U.S. Forces from Vietnam, though having never suffered any major tactical defeats, the Army did leave
defeated at the strategic level. Distraught over the loss
of a hitherto undefeated record on the field of battle,
the Army sought to distance itself from the painful
memories of Vietnam. Rationalizing the strategic defeat in Vietnam, Army leadership ostensibly attributed the loss to political causes and vowed to never fight
a protracted insurgency war again, instead preferring
to prepare its forces for more traditional, conventional
warfare against peer competitors that presented existential threats to the United States.14 There are many
differences between the Army after the Vietnam War
and the Army leaving Iraq, not the least of which is
that the Army leaving Iraq has returned home confident in their tactical victory and to a lesser extent of
strategic success of their mission in Iraq. Clearly, only
time will tell whether the established representative
democracy and stability in Iraq will last and history
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will have to judge whether the sacrifices were worth
the costs. In the immediate aftermath of the war in
Iraq, though, the perception is that Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM was a success. In addition, as suggested
above, the U.S. Army faces no immediate peer competitor in conventional warfare who is likely to contest
the U.S. Army on the field of battle. Though the sheer
size and growing technological advancements of the
Chinese Army could present a threat to U.S. forces,
nuclear deterrence, strategic imbalance in naval and
air forces, and economic interdependence make the
probability of such conflict unlikely in the near future.
Finally, though directives can change with the transition of political and military leadership, Department
of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 published on November 28, 2005, directs that:
[S]tability operations are a core U.S. military mission
that the Department of Defense shall be prepared
to conduct and support and that they shall be given
priority comparable to combat operations and explicitly addressed. . . . across all DoD activities including
doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises,
materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and planning.15

Having learned from the mistakes in the postVietnam era and wanting to ensure that the adaptation resulting from the Army’s experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan endures, SSTR operations have been elevated in joint and Army doctrine and planning to the
same level as major combat operations.
Proponents of the second school of thought outlined by Frank Hoffman, called the ”Traditionalists,”
represent the other end of the spectrum of conflict.
Traditionalists seek to “re-establish the traditional fo-
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cus of the armed forces on fighting and winning the
nation’s wars,” warning against restructuring or reorienting ground forces “away from their traditional emphasis on large-scale, industrial-age warfare against
states or an alliance of states.”16 Traditionalists do not
deny that irregular warfare occurs commonly in the
modern era, but they argue that these small wars do
not represent an existential threat to the nation. They
argue that armed forces prepared to fight major combat operations in large-scale industrial warfare can
handle the challenges presented by counterinsurgency missions and fear that the “newfound embrace of
messy, protracted counterinsurgencies” tends to degrade the combat skills of the nation’s land forces due
to the high operations tempo of these long wars.17 To
be sure, the Army’s core competencies in fighting conventional wars have eroded over the last decade.18 In
truth, very few of the majors and sergeants first class
and below in the Army can remember, much less skillfully execute, combined arms maneuver integrating
armor, infantry, aviation, and artillery on the battlefield. The Army desperately needs an opportunity to
return to these basics of conventional warfare in order
to be prepared to match a conventional force on the
field of battle. However, merely focusing on conventional fights and wishing away the types of wars the
Army does not want to fight—the messy and protracted counterinsurgency fights—is potentially naïve and
irresponsible. First and foremost, the historical record
shows that America’s political leaders will send the
Army into harm’s way whether or not prepared. Senior military leaders when facing budgetary and force
reductions have testified before Congress on the need
to be judicious when reducing the force, lest the nation be left with a hollow force, unprepared to meet
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the call when again sent to war.19 Likewise, as senior
Army leaders have also asserted, the Chief of Staff
of the Army does not have the luxury of telling the
President of the United States that the Army cannot or
will not accomplish a mission assigned when called.
The Army must be prepared to accomplish any mission along the full spectrum of conflict. Second, senior
leaders of the Army have a moral obligation to the
nation and to the families of these great Soldiers to
prepare them for the types of conflicts that the nation
will face. At the outset of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an unpreparedness to fight protracted stability
operations and a desire to utilize conventional warfare strategy versus counterinsurgency strategy led to
unnecessary deaths of countless Soldiers. Traditionalists argue that only conventional, large-scale wars can
threaten the existence of the United States and that
lesser forms of conflict along the full spectrum of operations are simpler, “lesser included cases that can be
handled by a conventionally trained and structured
force.”20 Though there is some truth in this assertion,
the lives lost while trying to relearn lessons of counterinsurgency warfare in a conventionally trained
force are tragic, especially when integration of these
lessons into the institutional Army following the current wars may have spared those lives. Finally, though
arguments that only massed conventional forces can
directly threaten the sovereignty of the United States
appears at face value to be true, this discounts the loss
of prestige and influence that America would likely
endure if it seeks to abstain from all small wars out
of a desire to focus exclusively on domestic issues
and only large-scale industrial war. As Clausewitz
asserted centuries ago, war remains an extension of
policy by other means. The Army must be prepared to
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respond when called on by the nation’s political leaders. Failed states and transnational threats can directly
threaten the stability of the country if those threats
lead to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The capability to intervene in failing states or
to put a stop to state-sponsored terrorism is necessary
to provide for the territorial and economic security
of the country. In addition, though rogue states and
transnational actors are unlikely to pose an existential
threat to the nation, their actions can drive the United
States to a posture of isolationism or detachment from
the world, thus diminishing U.S. capacity to protect
American interests abroad. The United States, as the
world’s leading superpower, provides much of the
stability that secures the opportunities for commerce
and peaceful international relations to solve differences. The Armed Forces must be prepared to intervene
when called upon by the national command authority
across the full spectrum of conflict in order to maintain the ability to influence national interests worldwide and to remain a relevant world leader.
The third and fourth schools of thought outlined
by Frank Hoffman include the ”Utility Infielder” and
the “Division of Labor” schools. In both schools of
thought, advocates recognize the need to be prepared
for both conventional warfare and counterinsurgencies and advocate different ways to provide these
capabilities. The Division of Labor proponents argue
that because of the complexity and markedly different skill sets necessary to successfully prosecute either major combat operations or a counterinsurgency
campaign, the best strategy for preparedness along
the entire spectrum of conflict is to design forces with
the appropriate structure, equipment, and training to
specialize in each respective mode of conflict.21 These
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advocates place a greater emphasis on deterrence and
conflict avoidance prior to escalation of hostilities.
Most argue for a roughly 65/35 mix of conventional
force focused and stability operations focused brigade
combat teams. According to Hoffman, Division of
Labor advocates tend to believe that by specializing
forces, the Army and Marines can maintain the forces
trained and proficient in handling small wars while
shifting “some of the burden for deterring and defeating large-scale aggression to air and naval forces.”22
Hoffman points out that the most likely threats facing the military in the future will involve Iran, China,
or North Korea, that all three of these scenarios are
vulnerable to stand-off precision warfare, and that in
these instances U.S. political interests can be guaranteed or obtained reliably without ground forces.23 This
assumes that the government can accurately predict
where the next conflict will occur, that accurate prediction of how other state or nonstate actors may act
based on a presumption of America’s own paradigm
of rationality is even possible, and that other currently
stable areas will not become destabilized through unforeseen actions in the near future. None of these are
safe assumptions. In truth, the sheer impact on the
conventional force over the last decade of fighting two
simultaneous stability operations has taken its toll on
the morale, readiness, and training of the force.24 These
two wars required the commitment of every Brigade
Combat Team in the active Army and equivalent unit
in the Marines at the pace of being deployed at least 1
out of every 3 years, often at a ratio of 1 out of every
2 years. In the late 1990s, no one in the Army anticipated such a high pace of operational deployments.
To specialize only 35 percent of the force for commitment to stability operations is, at best, a risky venture
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and potentially will make it impossible for the U.S.
Armed Forces to win a sustained counterinsurgency
fight. The size of the force necessary for commitment
in the next stability operation is unknown, therefore
the total force must remain prepared to fight the nation’s battles, no matter where these battles fall within
the full spectrum of conflict. Consequently, the third
school of thought described by Frank Hoffman remains the most prevalent among military leaders and
the best option for the future force.
Utility Infielders seek a balance between the counterinsurgent and traditionalist approaches by adapting the force structure slightly to embrace the lessons
learned in Iraq but yet retaining the Army’s advantages
and preparedness to fight conventional warfare. They
advocate a return to basics in order to address the much
atrophied skill sets of conducting major combat operations, which the Army has not seen on the scale that it
trained for in the 1980s and 1990s, and last experienced
in Operation DESERT STORM, albeit briefly. Utility
Infielders argue that reduced budgets and unknowns
in the scope and magnitude of future conflict as well
as the category of conflict America will face necessitate
that the entire Army be trained and ready to handle all
forms of conflict across the full spectrum. This school
“seeks to cover the entire spectrum of conflict and
avoid the risk of being optimized at either extreme . . .
[and] spreads the risk by investing in quality forces,
educating its officers for agility in complex problems,
and creating tough but flexible training programs.”25
Many experts, to include senior military officials,
recognize that the greatest current threat to U.S. national security in an age of soaring deficits and domestic economic challenges is economic recession, or
worse, collapse.26 Recent efforts to reverse the trend of
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drastically rising deficit spending have captured the
attention of all and guarantee that the military can expect much smaller budgets.27 In this age of fiscal austerity, Army leadership continues to emphasize the
importance of balanced and prudent force restructuring, continued modernization where necessary, and
dogmatic insistence on maintaining force readiness.
Utility Infielders believe that the Army can cover the
entire spectrum of conflict by investing in top quality
forces, trained, and educated in being agile, adaptive,
and knowledgeable in all aspects of the full spectrum
of conflict. In the words of the former Chief of Staff
of the Army and new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Martin Dempsey,
Despite the changing character of conflict and increased capability of potential adversaries, the challenge of conducting military operations on land
remains fundamentally unchanged. Actions have
meaning on the ground because of the interaction of
people and as a result of the interdependence of societal factors . . . humanitarian relief, peacekeeping,
counterinsurgency and major combat operations are
all part of the spectrum of conflict and therefore equal
claimants to a position along the full spectrum of operations... [We must be able to accomplish] maneuver
and security against whatever threat presents itself.28

The Utility Infielder school of thought is not without its flaws. Detractors of this school of thought argue
that the complexity of conventional warfare and stability operations almost guarantee that efforts to ensure
that the Army is structured and trained to do both
ensures that they will master neither. Though these
admonitions are well founded, Utility Infielders argue
that the Army has long demonstrated its resourceful-
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ness and immense ability to master many skills and
that the future force is up to the challenge. Detractors
of the Utility Infielder school of thought also argue
that in an age of fiscal austerity, the costs of maintaining readiness through training and education, and of
modernizing equipment suitable for the entire spectrum of conflict are too great.29 In truth, some modernization may need to be postponed until the economy
recovers fully; however, the costs of losing a conflict for
which the nation is wholly unprepared or the loss of
influence and prestige for the United States as a world
leader could, and in all probability would, be much
greater.30 Some costs will be necessary to ensure that
the equipment already acquired, which has enabled
success on the field of battle in Iraq and Afghanistan,
is maintained and refurbished because it can be useful
in future environments. As the analysis of the institutional Army will show below, much of the equipment whether designed for conventional warfare or
for stability operations of recent years remains some
of the best in the world and merely requires revitalization costs and limited modernization. There will
be costs incurred in the sustainment of training and
education in the full spectrum of operations; however,
these costs are necessary when facing the reality of the
uncertainty of future conflicts and the moral imperative to ensure the land forces are prepared for military
operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. Few,
if any, predicted the “Arab Spring” in early 2011 and
the dust has yet to settle from this significant evolution bordering on revolution in the Middle East. The
world does not yet know what the impact of a truly
democratic Egypt will be and may not like what it
gets. If a democratic Egypt results in a marginalization
or dumping of the Camp David Accords and a return

14

to hostilities between Israel and Egypt, U.S. military
intervention may be necessary to preserve America’s
ally, Israel, and more importantly, to maintain stability in this very volatile and strategically vital region
of the world.31 That intervention could be limited to
military advisors or could range to major conventional force commitment. The influence of the Jewish
lobby and conservative Christian right in American
politics has long swayed American foreign policy in
the region and the Armed Forces must be prepared to
respond where politics dictate. Some may believe that
the prevalence of domestic economic concerns may
preclude involvement or commitment of forces in regional disputes, but in most cases, such assumptions
have proven wrong. One only needs to consider the
environment in the days following the collapse of the
Soviet Union with the Cold War concluded in favor
of the United States and the assumption that with this
peace dividend, the United States could significantly
draw down its forces. In reality, the period following
the end of the Cold War has seen far more commitment of land forces than ever before across the entire
spectrum of conflict in times of both economic affluence and recession. Whether committing forces to the
support of humanitarian missions in Haiti or Somalia
on the lower end of the spectrum, to commitment of
medium-sized forces on long-term peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, to large-scale commitment of conventional forces in long-term stability operations and the initial ground offensives in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the nation will call upon the land forces
to fight whether or not the Army is prepared. Assuming a peace dividend based on domestic economic
concerns as a deterrent to committing land forces or
the absence of a current peer competitor capable of
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threatening U.S. sovereignty is dangerous and historically inconsistent. America’s leaders have a tendency
to send the Army into harm’s way, confident that it
can accomplish any mission because of its track record
as a can-do, learning organization.
Consequently, the Army must ensure that the adaptation achieved in the war in Iraq is not lost, and
that the Army does not revert back to focusing on the
mode of warfare which it finds most comfortable and
decisive. The military professional’s solemn oath demands that the Army extend the transformation that
it undertook in the sands of Iraq and apply it to the
institutional Army, ensuring the integration of these
lessons where appropriate across the Army’s DOTMLPF. Assuming that counterinsurgency strategy
will remain relevant in future conflict, it is imperative
that military professionals strive to inculcate the lessons from the hard earned experiences in Iraq. The
institutional Army must preserve these hard-earned
lessons and implement appropriate changes based on
the enduring and relevant aspects of the national security environment, which are not merely unique to
Iraq, but which can better inform the strategies of future stability operations. The remainder of this Paper
will highlight some of those lessons and make recommendations for change that appear most significant to
ensure that the general purpose forces, assuming the
Utility Infielder approach, are prepared to fight and
win across the full spectrum of warfare.
THE TURNING POINT IN IRAQ
By the end of 2006, the security situation in Iraq
was rapidly deteriorating as sectarian violence raged,
faith and trust in the Iraqi government waned, and
much of the educated citizenry needed for the recon16

struction of Iraq fled out of fear that they could no longer contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq while ensuring
the safety of their families. The two-fold strategy of
targeting terrorists and extremists while transitioning
security to the ISF met countless failures as the ISF
often proved ill-equipped or inadequately trained to
assume the lead in holding cleared terrain or worse,
unwilling to perform and intimidated by both sides of
a growing sectarian fight to either passively or actively take part in the violence on one side or the other;
this violence was oft described as the harbinger of an
all-out civil war. The previous strategy simply did not
work and needed to change to the more population
centric approach advocated in conventional counterinsurgency theory. As captured in the research study
outlining the successful integrated counterinsurgency
approach taken against Sunni and Shia insurgents in
2007 and 2008, the strategy had to change from “just
killing the enemy, . . .just spending money on reconstruction projects, . . .and just putting the Iraqis in
charge.”32 Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and
II achieved dismal results because the Iraqis were not
ready to assume responsibility and the Army’s focus
was not on the center of gravity—the population.
Seeking unprecedented cooperation, civil and military partners employed a new strategy based on the
following principles.
(1) Make the population and its security the centerpiece of the effort allowing time for economic and
political progress; (2) Establish a detailed understanding of the operational environment; (3) Engage in and
win a battle of the ideas. Help the population see that
supporting the government of Iraq was the best way
forward; (4) Walk the walk. Require every coalition
civilian and soldier to become a counterinsurgency
warrior.33
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Beyond the addition of the five brigade combat
teams with what came to be known as “the Surge,”
a change in mindset across three key areas made the
difference. The strategy shifted to a population-centric
focus centered on protecting the people so as to isolate the insurgents from the people, ensuring that they
could no longer intimidate nor coerce passive or active support. In addition, the provision of additional
forces in Baghdad, Mosul, and Al Anbar allowed U.S.
and Coalition Forces to push out into Joint Security
Stations (JSSs) and Combat Outposts (COPs) to be
closer to the people and gain their trust and cooperation. Finally, the change in mindset required U.S.
Forces to step outside of a western understanding
of honor and justice.34 It was imperative to break the
cycle of violence. Many insurgents were weary of the
violence and sought peace for their tribes and families
but remained compelled by their definition of honor
and justice to exact retribution on the U.S. Forces and
ISF when members of their family were harmed or
killed. A western mindset of justice which sought to
kill or capture all who conducted attacks on security
forces merely perpetuated the cycle of violence. An
emphasis on distinguishing the reconciliables from
the irreconciliables yielded opportunities to break the
cycle of violence and brought to the table many of the
battle-weary Shia militants who wanted to protect
their own people and sought peace. This led to the
famous Anbar Awakening and reconciliation efforts
that led U.S. Forces to accept and embrace as partners
in security, former insurgents who weeks and months
earlier killed American servicemen.
One of the most significant findings of the case
study of successful counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq
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was the absolute necessity for unity of effort between
civil and military authorities, both American and Iraqi.
“The integration of civilian and military staffs could
not be achieved simply by setting policy. Staffs have
markedly different cultures and approaches . . . [therefore] integration took an active and constant effort to
ensure that frictions were overcome.”35 Partnering had
to occur at all levels from senior level leaders and staff
down to Brigade Combat Teams and Battalions paired
with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Through this
partnership alignment of the instruments of national
power could occur to achieve a common purpose.36
THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
One of the most important lessons of the success
in Iraq is the indispensable role of applying all instruments of national power to succeed in a counterinsurgency campaign. Though this Paper does not strive to
exhaustively outline how each of these instruments
ought to be leveraged as a component of a strategy to
win irregular warfare, an understanding of what one
means when discussing the instruments of national
power is necessary. This understanding helps guide
the absolutely crucial efforts to achieve a whole of
government approach which serves as a prerequisite
to defeating insurgents. As aptly covered in the Army
doctrinal publication on counterinsurgency strategy,
Field Manual (FM) 3-24,
Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and
counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people
to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.
Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including appeals to
religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and
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economic—to overthrow the existing authority. This
authority may be an established government or an
interim governing body. Counterinsurgents, in turn,
use all instruments of national power to sustain the
established or emerging government and reduce the
likelihood of another crisis emerging.37

By virtue of its training and exhaustive doctrinal foundation, the Army is adept at leveraging the
military instrument of national power to prosecute its
strategy to win decisively on the battlefield. However,
the lessons of the last decade in Iraq make it clear that
leveraging the other instruments of national power are
imperative to success in defeating insurgents. Since
publication of FM 3-24, the instruments of national
power have been expanded by most scholars and
strategists to include more than just the diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic tools but also
include financial, intelligence, and law enforcement.38
The military may not take the lead in applying the
diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement instruments of national
power, but by virtue of its role in providing security to
a war-ravaged environment and its hierarchy and capacity for large-scale operations, the military must absolutely understand the important role of applying all
of the instruments of national power. The Army must
recognize that a blind, Draconian application of only
the military instrument can undermine the ultimate
success of the strategic goals and merely prolong the
conflict rather than resolve it. In this context, instruments of national power refer to the means and methods employed by a state to exert its influence or power
over another state or, on occasion, nonstate actors.
Diplomacy is the art of communicating intentions and exerting, influencing, and building associations with other actors in the international arena,
20

most frequently employing tools such as negotiations,
recognition, treaties, and alliances. Insurgent groups
pursue these tools, much like states do, striving to
garner popular and external support for their cause to
legitimize their ideals while undermining the regime.
Through diplomatic negotiations, insurgents strike
deals with state and nonstate actors external to their
country to assist them in their cause, seeking to garner
support and safe havens, and to add to their legitimacy and the populace’s perception of their viability as a
replacement for the current regime. The State Department typically takes the lead in U.S. efforts in the diplomatic arena but the Army must understand its role
in complementing State Department efforts to combat
the insurgents.39
The power of ideas and information cannot be
understated. Insurgents typically wage an aggressive
information campaign to win the hearts and minds
of the people and add to the perception not only that
their cause is just but also that they represent a better alternative to the existing regime. As highlighted
above, political power is at stake. Information campaigns, combined with actions to supplant the government’s efforts to provide for its people, are the most
effective way to erode the perception of the legitimacy
of the existing regime. Governments typically have
the advantage in this area, as they often control access
to the media. However, insurgents also have access
to means to spread their message. Tools available include fomenting revolutionary ideas under the guise
of academic or religious freedom and expression of
ideas. In addition, they often utilize propaganda tools
such as the internet, leaflets, and multimedia discs,
without which an insurgency is less likely to succeed
at winning popular support. The insurgents in Iraq
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have proven particularly adroit in this area, and this
single instrument of national power warrants significant attention in the aftermath of the war in Iraq; a better whole of government approach, one that is more
proactive and responsive, is necessary. Again, the Department of State typically takes the lead in this area,
however, a review of the tools available to the State
Department and how the Army should complement
those efforts is necessary.
When one thinks of insurgents, what comes to
mind most readily is the military arm. Often the most
costly portion of an insurgency’s campaign against
the regime, the military instrument typically receives
the most attention by both insurgent forces and the
government. Insurgents may seek external support
for their military campaign in the form of training,
weapons, advisors, or actual combat forces. This support can come from state actors or other insurgents
or terrorists either inside or outside the country. The
military of the regime often has both numerical and
technological advantages over the insurgents, necessitating unique and unconventional strategies. Under
these circumstances, insurgents employ their forces on
the asymmetrical battlefield to counter governmental
strengths. Insurgents often employ terror tactics to intimidate the masses who do not support them, seeking
to coerce passive or active support from the masses.
One of the most overlooked instruments of national power, the economic instrument is vital to
success in a counterinsurgency fight or any stability
operation. The government uses economic power to
exert its influence abroad and foster prosperity. One
of the key lessons from Iraq has been that economic
efforts with a short-term perspective can often be
detrimental to long-term success. Efforts to target the
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root causes of insurgency—and the popular support
for insurgents—with economic measures which yield
ephemeral gains often end up further financing the
insurgency, thus perpetuating it in the long run. The
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) typically take the lead
in guiding economic strategies to undermine the insurgency and conduct nation-building efforts seeking
to guide a failed state or failing state to a more stable
environment. However, with significantly larger resources at their disposal through such programs as
the Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP)
and with doctrine guiding its employment under the
concept of Money As a Weapon System (MAWS), military professionals must study the indispensable role
of economic development in undermining insurgency
and the potentially deleterious effects of misguided
economic efforts without an eye to longer-term economic and civil capacity development.40
The financial instrument of national power, in the
context of counterinsurgency strategy, typically addresses efforts by a government to undermine and
interdict funding streams for insurgents. This often
involves freezing or seizing assets held by insurgents
or their sponsors, especially when linkages can be
demonstrated. As the military often lacks the tools to
be directly involved in these efforts, military professionals often fail to recognize and pass on invaluable
intelligence that may assist the whole of government
efforts to target insurgent income sources.41
As a critical war fighting function for military
strategy, the intelligence instrument of national power appears to be a key component of the military element of national power. However, Army leaders must
recognize that military intelligence is merely a small
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component of the total resources and capacity of the
national level intelligence. Strategic level intelligence
complements on site intelligence and the ability to filter raw data and transform that into knowledge and
understanding about the adversary is vital to defeating insurgents. Unlike traditional military intelligence
in a conventional battle where the enemy acts along
doctrinal orders of battle and conventions, intelligence
in the counterinsurgency fight necessitates collating a
vast amount of information, working closely with coalition partners, integrating human and technical intelligence and leveraging a plethora of tools and assets
in order to optimally target threat groups.42
Finally, the war in Iraq has taught us that any
counterinsurgency campaign clearly must include
partnerships with both U.S. and host nation law enforcement agencies. Hybrid threats merging criminal,
terrorist, and insurgent activities continue to hamper
law enforcement professionals, military engaged in
counterinsurgency fights, and political leaders worldwide. In addition, one must advance the rule of law in
order to succeed at nation-building and civil capacity
development in a state plagued by insurgency. This
necessitates relying on law enforcement and judiciary
experts and the willingness to subordinate military efficiency and often effectiveness for the sake of achieving the long-term stability achieved in a state that adheres to the rule of law.43 One of the most significant
challenges in any counterinsurgency fight, however,
lies in preventing, eliminating, and when not possible
mitigating corruption. Different standards and expectations exist in each culture for levels of acceptable
corruption. Insurgents often point to corruption in
economic programs, law enforcement, and favoritism
as justification for the overthrow of the government.
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Any strategy that seeks to apply the elements of national power must address corruption within a cultural context, seeking to remedy perceptions of relative
deprivation among the population, while recognizing
that, in many cases, one must accept nominal levels of
favoritism and even some limited corruption because
zero defect approaches to such things are unrealistic
and often are counterintuitive within certain cultural
settings, especially in developing nations.44
DOTMLPF RECOMMENDATIONS
Learning has occurred in the Army over the last
decade; however, these lessons will be wasted unless
institutional adaptation occurs. As David Ucko asserted, “a military organization’s learning can occur on
two levels: through bottom-up adaptation in the field
and through top-down innovation at the institutional
level.”45 As adaptation in Iraq showed, the Army has
deftly achieved the former in contact with the enemy
in the sands of Iraq; however, as U.S. Forces depart
Iraq, one must identify the changes that the Army
can afford and that the future of conflict necessitates.
In fact, some have aptly asserted that change implemented in Iraq actually defies industrial-age models
for organizational change in that it resulted not solely
through top-down or bottom-up models but instead
occurred at all levels almost simultaneously. As a
result of information-age technology enabling communities of practice like Company Commander.com and
the near real-time capacity for reach-back to subject
matter expertise in the United States resulting from relationships struck between many Division Headquarters and their partner domestic cities’ municipal governments, the Army accelerated its learning curve and
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improved its adaptation at all levels. Complemented
by an insatiable thirst by military professionals to find
new ways to solve complex problems, Army professionals at all levels went to great lengths to share
experiences across the force and sought knowledge
outside normal subject matter expertise of the military
profession by linking in with domestic civilian experts.
As a result, a whole new model for organizational
change has been born, resulting from the advantages
provided by technology to adapt at all levels nearly
simultaneously. This adaptation, however, is at great
risk of being lost without an initiative to capture these
techniques for enhancing critical reasoning and problem solving by capitalizing on technology, inculcating
how to learn and adapt in our institutional Army, and
ensuring that the experiential knowledge of how to
enhance knowledge management is integrated into
the Army’s professional education system. Striking
that balance between resources available in a fiscally
austere environment and the moral obligation to keep
the Army prepared and ready for the full spectrum of
operations in which it will be employed necessitates a
balanced approach to making evolutionary changes to
the Army’s DOTMLPF in the years ahead.
Doctrine.
In order to defeat an enemy, one must understand
the enemy he faces. A fundamental principle of Army
doctrine lies in the axiom that one must see oneself,
see the terrain, and see the enemy—this truism is especially salient at the strategic level when combating
an insurgency. In May 2009, Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that success against asymmetric threats will rest heavily on
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the nation’s ability to institutionalize, in doctrine, the
knowledge that the force gained in Iraq.46 One of the
most significant long-term adaptations resulting from
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was the development of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
dated December 15, 2006. This doctrinal update aptly
captures the principles and guidelines for conducting counterinsurgency operations, rooted in historical examples, informed by well-organized academic
scholarly writings and updated in contemporary experiences. This doctrinal foundation formed the basis
for the successful strategy in Iraq and served as one
of the principal reasons why President George Bush
selected General David Petraeus to become the new
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander as he
sought to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy in 2007
to turn back the tide of successive failures and setbacks
in 2006. Bard O’Neill’s text, Insurgency and Terrorism,
served as the foundation to the new doctrine’s methodology of analyzing and classifying an insurgency in
order to achieve the best strategy to defeat it.47 This text
provides a superb foundation for “seeing the enemy”
and provides one of the most comprehensive, systematic and straight-forward formats for analyzing and
understanding the type of insurgency that one faces.
The nation’s success in Iraq is directly attributable
to adopting the counterinsurgency strategy found in
the new doctrine of FM 3-24 and the principles of a
more integrated civil-military cooperative effort leveraging all the instruments of national power to achieve
complementary effects in undermining root causes of
the insurgency, while enhancing the perception and
reality of legitimacy for the host nation government.
As discovered by General (Ret.) Leon LaPorte’s research team and captured in The Comprehensive Ap-
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proach: An Iraq Case Study, every coalition civilian and
Soldier had to become a counterinsurgency warrior.48
In practical application, this required military leaders
from the squad to theater level to recognize that military objectives must be nested with long-term political goals. Soldiers had to look beyond the immediate
goals of a military strategy and look to the long-term
second- and third-order effects.49
As for counterinsurgency doctrine, the Army has
a solid foundation in FM 3-24. There are however,
two recommended areas of further improvement necessary to ensure that the lessons of this war are not
lost as the experienced practitioners of this successful strategy in Iraq move to the cadre of nonpracticing
professionals. First, the Army must capture the techniques, tactics, and procedures that made the application of counterinsurgency strategy successful. The
foreword of FM 3-24 acknowledges that the doctrine
“takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations.”50 The doctrine found in FM 3-24 deftly captures the essence of understanding one’s enemy, protecting the population, and targeting the root causes
of insurgency through cooperative and integrated
efforts that capitalize on complementary effects of all
of the instruments of national power, but it lacks guidance on how this might occur in practice. Though FM
3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, provides a useful
supplement to FM 3-24, facilitating understanding of
counterinsurgency tactical operations at the company,
battalion and brigade levels based on adaptation to effectively conduct stability operations in Iraq, a gap in
the doctrine exists in better explaining what role the
tactical and operational leaders play in leveraging all
of the instruments of national power to achieve strategic goals.51 An opportunity exists for a comprehensive
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study that helps to explain how leaders at every level
support the overall integrated counterinsurgency
strategy in a whole of government approach.
Secondly, though in practice on the ground under
the leadership first of Ambassador Ryan Crocker and
General Petraeus followed by each of their successors,
desired civil-military cooperation was achieved to facilitate greater unity of effort, the doctrine explaining
the roles and responsibilities for the application of all
of the instruments of national power is lacking.52 The
nature of the hybrid threat and the fact that U.S. power
could be challenged for so long in Iraq, very narrowly
avoiding defeat, all but guarantees that future enemies
will challenge us asymmetrically seeking protracted
conflict over decisive battles and insurgent strategies
over conventional ones. The Army’s doctrine and experience demonstrate that a whole of government approach is necessary to achieve success. As averred by
Edward Marks, “the so-called nexus of security challenges—terrorism, narcotics, smuggling, international
criminal networks, etc.—can no longer be managed as
single agency programs but must be integrated into
‘whole of government’ programs.”53 As such, the U.S.
Government needs to capture doctrine that delineates
responsibilities for each aspect of a whole of government approach. This doctrine can and must be revised
based on the unique circumstances of each environment but a foundational document is necessary that
can guide this critical component to an integrated civil-military approach to defeat insurgencies. The DoD
and the Department of the Army can play a role in
helping to guide and craft recommendations for this
doctrine as doctrinal development remains one of the
military’s traditional strengths.
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Organization.
For the most part, the Army’s force structure has
remained optimized for major combat operations.
Organizationally, the Army made short-term modifications to enable security force assistance by initially
mobilizing tens of thousands of advisors to serve as
Military Transition Teams (MiTT) and later by creating Security Transition Teams (STTs) to augment each
brigade deploying after the summer of 2009, thus
completing the transformation of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) into the Advise and Assist Brigade
(AAB). These organizational changes were temporary
in nature and brought together teams and units for the
discrete period of the deployment to enable the military to succeed at one of its principal roles of Security
Force Assistance (SFA). These efforts sought to enable
the military instrument of national power to contribute to long-term stability in Iraq by directly facilitating the enhanced capacity and capability of the ISF
through advise, train, and assist functions. Though
some members of the counterinsurgent school of
thought may advocate reorganizing the basic building block of deployable combat troops, tossing out the
modular BCT, this approach is fraught with risks. As
articulated above, the Army must remain prepared for
all levels of conflict along the full spectrum of operations, and it is improbable that a redesigned brigade
formation optimized for counterinsurgency operations would be well-suited for major combat operations. Consequently, the modular BCT should retain
its current organization with perhaps greater integration of subordinate civil affairs units or skill sets covered in greater detail under the category of Personnel
below. Recent initiatives to consider subtle changes to

30

the modular BCT, while regionally aligning brigades
not currently slated for deployment to Army Service
Component Commands (ASCCs), hold great promise
for helping to prepare forces for possible contingency
operations and to facilitate greater understanding of
the regional operating environment while preparing
for the full spectrum of operations.
Other capabilities have proven invaluable to the
success of the mission in Iraq. Small teams of experts
with unique skill sets have been added to BCTs in Iraq
in order to provide capability uniquely needed and
especially critical in stability operations. These skills
must be codified in some manner to ensure that they
are retained for future conflicts. To name a few, the
expertise provided by Weapons Intelligence Teams
(WITs) in exploitation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unique unconventional weaponry;
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) skilled in providing
insight into the population and how they may react
in order to enhance operational effectiveness, save
lives, and reduce military and civilian conflict; and
Law Enforcement Professionals (LEPs) who provide
insights to military commanders in how to develop
prosecutable cases based on evidence vice intelligence
when targeting insurgents were proved invaluable in
Iraq. In the current budgetary environment, adding
these organizations to the BCT table of organization
and equipment is improbable; however, the Army can
seek to train some similar skills and expertise in those
organizations that have more limited roles in stability
operations. For instance, on a recent deployment to
Iraq, the 3rd BCT of 4th Infantry Division’s (ID) chemical reconnaissance platoon received training so that
it could perform the WIT mission for the brigade in
southern Iraq. Though unlikely to be able to build the
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depth of anthropological, sociological, and linguistic
expertise in the active force found in the HTTs recently deployed to Iraq, a serious look at creating this capacity within the reserve components merits consideration. The reserves should also consider developing
organizations to train and maintain LEP expertise for
future requirements.
Nonetheless, recommendations for change to
the organizational structure within the institutional
Army and generating force are warranted. Criticisms
abound against the generating force’s ability to provide replacement personnel in a timely manner under
the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model.
Occasionally, the equipping and training cycles of
the ARFORGEN process were horribly out of synch
with the manning cycle, resulting in units preparing
for tours in combat at far less than their authorized
manning until weeks or months before the unit’s deploy date.54 Organizational and policy changes are
warranted to ensure that these ARFORGEN cycles are
better aligned—lives often depend on it. Additionally,
though the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) will likely
decrease in the coming years as U.S. Forces withdraw
first from Iraq and then Afghanistan, the need to keep
the general purpose forces prepared to respond across
the full spectrum of conflict will necessitate creative
strategies in addressing periodic major combat operations focused training and counterinsurgency and
stability operations focused training. This, combined
with declining resources in light of reduced defense
budgets for the near future, will necessitate that the
Army strike the right balance between live, virtual,
and constructive training. Though addressed in greater detail below under the Training and Facilities headings, the institutional Army, particularly under the
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Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), must
look to redesign itself to maximize use of virtual training technology to allow units at company, battalion,
and ideally up to brigade level to train using simulations in stability operations.55
Finally, though outside the direct authority of the
senior leadership of the Army, the realization that the
only path to success in stability operations, especially
in the counterinsurgency fight, lies in a whole of government approach, necessitates a relook at the DoD’s
ground combatant commands (GCCs) to better integrate civilian and military assets and ensure continuous interagency cooperation. If the Army is sincere
about its desire to better enable a whole of government
approach to resolve conflicts in the future, change is
needed not just in the wartime organizations designed
to handle conflict but also in peace-time organizations
to better foster interagency cooperation. Much like
the need for the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which
forced greater joint force cooperation, redesign of
the government’s approach to regional interagency
cooperation will likely require legislative action by
Congress. In their article, “Death of the Combatant
Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,”
authors Brigadier General Jeffery Buchanan, Captain
Maxie Davis and Colonel Lee Wright advocate the
replacement of geographical combatant commands
with Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOM), led by
highly credentialed civilians in permanent standing.
These civilian-led interagency organizations could
bring all of the instruments of national power to bear
in either peace or conflict. They aptly assess that the
greatest impediment to such progress lies in overcoming the resistance to dogmatic defense of “rice
bowls,” particularly in the DoD and a requirement for
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a significant funding increase for other major federal
government agencies that would play a role in these
new JIACOMs. The benefits of this approach are that
it could truly foster unity of effort across all of the instruments of national power through all phases of the
operation, and could ease angst in some regions by
minimizing the overt appearance of military dominance particularly in those areas that are sensitive to
military presence.56
At echelons below the GCC, military echelons
in Iraq partnered with U.S. regional embassy offices
(REOs), and developed provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) in order to pursue whole of government
solutions to winning the counterinsurgency. Initially,
PRTs were paired at the Brigade level and above, but
as the responsible drawdown of forces occurred in
Iraq, PRTs began to pair with battalions responsible for
whole provinces. This often left a gap in partnership at
the Brigade level, responsible for four to six provinces
with multiple PRT partners each paired with a subordinate battalion and each with competing priorities
and desires for the Brigade Commander’s attention.
In Iraq, these challenges were met without adding a
Department of State regional authority. However, in
Afghanistan, a Sub-National and Regional echelon,
led by the Department of State, was created to better partner with the DoD and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). From the
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook,
11-16, one can find,
To ensure all U.S. PRT efforts are synchronized, the
ambassador established the PRT Sub-National Government Office, which in August 2009 became the
Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) Office. The new
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name increased the emphasis on unity of effort among
U.S. Government agencies and to indicate that the
scope would be beyond just the PRTs. The IPA’s organizational structure parallels military command
and control structure. It has regional platforms (RPs)
that mirror the regional commands (RC), each with a
senior civilian representative (SCR), who is the counterpart to the military commander in each RC. The
SCR’s main task is to foster civil-military integration
through the civilians working under them at the task
force, PRT, and district support team (DST) levels.57

Though the IPA, RPs, and PRTs were created for
the specific applications of Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in the extremely decentralized operations
in Afghanistan, valuable lessons can be drawn and
should be retained for ensuring mirrored partnership
and cooperation occurs at every level to ensure unity
of effort and a true whole of government approach in
future stability operations.
Training.
The Utility Infielder approach outlined above necessitates periodic training in both major combat operations and stability operations to ensure that general
purpose forces are prepared for the entire spectrum of
conflict. Large-scale conventional warfare represents
the only existential threat to the nation and therefore, though improbable, must receive emphasis to
both deter a conventional attack on U.S. interests or
soil and to enable the U.S. military to fight and win
a conventional fight. Because of the greater probability that the Army will face hybrid threats challenging
the United States through a combination of irregular
warfare, terrorism, and transnational crime, the Army
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must also be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency
operations. Based in part on the turbulence in the
Army resulting from frequent personnel moves and
command cycles which are typically 2 years long, a
rotational cycle alternating between 1 year focused on
major combat operations and the next year on stability operations appears to offer the best solution to a
balanced approach for full spectrum training. Traditionally, combat training center (CTC) rotations have
served as the capstone event to any unit’s training for
combat operations or combat readiness. Because of
the realism and focus that the CTCs bring to training,
these centers must be protected from elimination in
DoD belt-tightening. To save money, there will necessarily be cutbacks. Redundancy and frivolous expenditures are rampant in training budgets but the quality of the U.S. Army and its adaptability and success
in the wars in the Middle East are in no small part a
result of the CTCs. Creating exportable packages for
the stability operations training cycles that can move
from installation to installation to facilitate counterinsurgency training will likely prove more cost effective
than dedicating a CTC to stability operations or creating an altogether new CTC. Potential also exists in untapped possibilities resulting from simulations training which might realistically create scenarios to train
general purpose forces to better understand the nature
of the counterinsurgency environment. A tremendous
cost in current efforts to create realistic environments
at the CTCs includes hiring thousands of Iraqi-Americans to simulate environments in which U.S. Forces
will serve. In light of defense budget cuts ahead and
the ambiguity of which environments U.S. Forces are
likely to deploy to in the future, the Army needs to
capitalize on savings achievable through greater reli-
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ance on virtual and constructive training.58 The institutional Army should take the lead in development of
these training scenarios and capabilities. Finally, the
Chief of Staff recently directed a study to align brigades regionally with ASCCs. Through this strategy,
BCTs not programmed for operational deployments
would focus their future scanning efforts, intelligence
analysis, and training scenarios on real-world possibilities in environments in which they might deploy.
This concept may ultimately allow these forces to train
for and achieve counterinsurgency and stability operations readiness at a training center located in a nation within the respective GCC or Regionally Aligned
Brigade (RAB) areas of operation.
As frequently identified in critiques of military
strategy in the early part of the Iraq war, one of the
fundamental flaws of U.S. strategy in Iraq included a
failure to truly understand both America’s adversaries and partners in the counterinsurgency and nationbuilding efforts. The change to a population-centric
strategy, and more importantly the realization that the
cycle of violence was being perpetuated by the very
efforts to stop the violence, led U.S. military leadership to expend significant efforts in training deploying units about Iraqi culture. This aided U.S. Forces
at all levels to consider the second- and third-order
effects of their choices and to better embrace both the
ISF with whom they were partnered and the people
whom they were responsible to protect. The Army
must never again underestimate the critical role of
understanding cultural differences, especially when
conducting counterinsurgency operations. Cultural
training goes beyond mere cultural awareness of
the language, artifacts, or symbols of a culture; one
must gain a true understanding of the underlying assumptions of another culture. A two-fold approach
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would facilitate greater cultural sensitivity. First, predeployment training must include extensive cultural
training—this is as important as inoculations, weapons training, or preparation of equipment. Second,
the Army should invest in cultural expertise in areas
where conflict remains probable. Prior to escalation
of hostilities and an order to deploy, this subject matter expertise could reside with the ASCCs but would
regularly be included in recurrent training opportunities with the regionally aligned brigades as part of the
ASCC’s Security Cooperation Plan (SCP).
As a final point for training, the PRTs proved invaluable in aligning efforts of the Department of State
and the DoD in each province in Iraq. With the military withdrawal from Iraq and scaling down of the
mission in Baghdad, the Department of State, through
the formation of the Civil Response Corps (CRC), has
already begun initiatives to ensure that organizationally State is at least partially restructured to provide
responsive interagency expertise ready to deploy
on short notice to serve in austere environments to
prevent conflict. The CRC is comprised of “specially
trained civilians from across the U.S. Government
who deploy rapidly to help countries mitigate conflict” providing a surge in civilian power consisting
of “diplomats, development specialists, public health
officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, and others” who help
fragile states restore stability and achieve economic
recovery.59 There remains, however, a tremendous
potential for military and other agency professionals
to lose the experience at achieving integrated civilmilitary cooperation to achieve decisive results. The
cultures, experiences, and jargon of the military professional and that of other federal agencies are vastly
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different. The creation of the CRC represents the first
step towards enabling State Department and other
federal agencies to rapidly deploy and respond to
contingencies; however, training is the necessary next
step. This training would help prevent atrophy of the
necessary cooperation between federal agencies and
the military in providing for regional stability in fragile or failed states, and could help ensure common understanding and appreciation for the talents and skills
each agency brings to the civil-military integrated approach to conflict resolution. We must strive to integrate CRC members and other members of the various
federal agencies responsible for elements of national
power into training designed to sustain in the Army
the experience and understanding of civilian agency
competencies and capabilities. As the Army tends toward the Utility Infielder approach, training Soldiers
in alternating cycles of MCO and counterinsurgency
will place the Army in the best position to facilitate
this cooperative civil-military training opportunity.
The State Department and others should be encouraged to eagerly participate in and support these training opportunities.
Materiel.
Materiel requirements for stability operations vice
a large-scale conventional battle are vastly different.
Some have argued that reliance on the tools of conventional warfare, namely heavy combat vehicles like
Abrams tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles,
long after the end of the conventional fight, exacerbated the conditions that expanded the support for the insurgency. There may be some truth to these assertions
as the difficulty of maneuver in an urban environment
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with such vehicles inevitably leads to unintended
damages. On the other hand, with the innovation by
insurgents in using Explosively Formed Projectiles
(EFPs), the Army lacked the platforms necessary to
protect its Soldiers while still minimizing the impact
on the populace. Protection of the populace must remain the foremost goal in any counterinsurgency fight
in order to isolate the insurgent from the populace.
Gains secured in protecting the population, however,
will be pyrrhic at best if these efforts are not balanced
with accepting only prudent risks and ensuring better
force protection measures for the Soldiers executing
the counterinsurgency strategy. The M1 tank could
be decisive in any set-piece battle against the insurgents but the insurgents rarely, if ever, contested the
Army in this way. A better platform for the day-today Clear-Build-Hold strategy of counterinsurgency
warfare and to facilitate nation-building was necessary. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles provided this enhancement that, though still
too big for some of the more densely populated areas,
greatly enabled U.S. Forces to conduct their missions.
Countless other innovations developed over the last
decade, including biometric identification technology,
robotic enhancements for IED interrogation, jamming
technology for IED defeat, and other protective equipment enhancements, greatly facilitated force protection and U.S. Forces’ ability to target the insurgents.
Materiel advancements attained over the last decade
to protect U.S. Forces and target elusive enemies were
essential to success in Iraq. The Army must refit and
recapitalize this major investment in its capability to
conduct stability operations and must continue to
train on this equipment. In addition, the Army has operated essentially under a “shadow” Modified Table
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of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) in Iraq and
Afghanistan, leaving behind much of the heavy combat vehicles at home station and receiving the fleet
of MRAPs as well as other state of the art technology
and off-the-shelf material solutions to accomplish the
mission in theater. A thorough look at the impact of
this vital equipment to discern what should be added
to unit MTO&Es is necessary to retain specialty equipment useful for anticipated future combat scenarios
while phasing out that equipment that merely met
problems which were short-term and unique to the
Iraq and Afghanistan situations. In some cases, limited personnel subject matter expertise or additional
skill identifiers (ASIs) and training should be captured
to operate, maintain, and service this specialized
equipment.60
Technology, however, is ever-changing and evolving. The capabilities developed for the fights in Iraq
and Afghanistan may not be effective in the next
counterinsurgency fight in which the Army finds itself. MRAPs would likely be too heavy for fighting an
insurgent force in a jungle environment and advancements in technology exploited by insurgents may
defeat jamming technology which was so successful
in overcoming the remotely controlled IED. More important to the Army’s ability to adapt and improve the
materiel necessary for stability operations is a significant overhaul of the acquisition process. Lieutenant
General Michael Vane, in a superb article published
in Military Review, describes two significant enhancements that would better improve the provision of the
essential materiel to the warfighter. Adaptation during a time of war is extremely complex and timeliness
of response is often a matter of life and death for the
troops on the front lines. As Lieutenant General Vane
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aptly identifies, sometimes equipment solutions in a
time of war, out of the compulsion to provide something to the fielded force to counter an enemy threat,
complicate the execution of other tasks, when the
solution lacks the “complete DOTMLPF package.”61
Fielding less than the complete package often leads
to unnecessary burdens placed on the field force. Offthe-shelf technology without the proper training in
its use, as well as complications in interoperability of
forces resulting from compatibility issues, can wreak
havoc on the operations of forces in the field.62 The
Army must overhaul the acquisition process to better
streamline provision of materiel solutions that support the warfighter while providing whole DOTMLPF
solutions. Lieutenant General Vane’s article provides
numerous suggestions on streamlining capabilities development for rapid implementation, better feedback
processes and testing of materiel by fielded forces before purchase, as well as enhanced Operational Needs
Statements (ONS) processing as necessary improvements to enable more effective provision of materiel
solutions to the combatant.63
Secondly, the DoD desperately needs acquisition
reform. “Fostering change and adaptation must move
beyond internal Army processes . . . to broaden into
the realm of weapons acquisition reform.”64 Though
the DoD has improved in its efforts to get the right
equipment to the troops over the last decade, more reform is necessary to ensure continued improvements
and to guarantee that a return to the cumbersome processes from before the war does not occur. In its current state, the acquisition process remains too timeconsuming to be responsive to the needs of the fielded
force. In 2009, Senator Carl Levin stated:
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Ninety-five of DoD’s largest acquisition programs
are, on average, 2 years behind schedule and have exceeded their original budgets by a combined total of
almost $300 billion . . . when the federal budget is under immense strain as a result of the economic crisis,
we simply cannot afford this kind of continued waste
and inefficiency.65

Lieutenant General Vane adroitly outlines the
challenges facing the acquisition community as time
and costs. As technology life-cycles are decreasing, on
average to 18 months, the time needed to develop and
field major weapon systems has increased to an average of 10 years.66 The hybrid threats that the Army faces can easily outmaneuver an acquisition process that
remains this unresponsive. Spiraling costs in acquisition processes coinciding with budget cuts will make
advancements cost prohibitive. For the Army’s part,
Lieutenant General Vane advocates simplification of
requirements, greater use of off-the-shelf technology,
rapid iterative prototyping, fielding of holistic solutions, and the placement of Soldiers on new prototype
systems as early in the process as possible.67
Finally, in this fiscally austere environment, governmental leaders will emphasize the need to cut costs.
Many of the recommendations in this report entail
costs that could be construed as prohibitive in light of
budget cuts. In recent months, Army leadership has
been emphasizing the importance of a balanced approach to drawdown and budgetary belt-tightening.
Cuts must be balanced across the three lines of end
strength, force structure, and programs. To cut one
more heavily than the other will lead to systems
without personnel to man them, personnel without
the equipment necessary to complete their tasks, or
programs without either the equipment or personnel
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needed to make them effective—thus leading to the
hollow Army that this country cannot afford. The materiel that the Army, and by extension the Air Force
and Navy, has to prosecute high intensity conflict remains some of the best in the world. The technological
overmatch of the M1A2SEP tank, the AH-64D attack
helicopter, and the Army’s command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence surveillance
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, just to name a
few, compared to the country’s closest competitor is
significant. Most analysts predict that the recession
America is experiencing will end within the next 5 to
15 years. With the technological superiority of the U.S.
Army over its closest competitor, a more concerted
effort should be made not just to strive for the next
advancement in capabilities for the sake of keeping
America’s competitive edge but should be focused on
that technology needed to keep a competitive edge
over the nation’s most likely adversaries’ capabilities.
In defense technology development, there is frequently a temptation to seek new technology merely for the
sake of having new imagined capabilities; however, in
this age of fiscal austerity, though it is vital to maintain some modernization efforts, these research and
development (R&D) priorities should be focused on
necessary requirements based on thorough strategic
environmental scanning. Some programs for materiel
enhancements may need to be postponed in order to
ensure that the training capability and readiness of
the force remains paramount in this fiscally austere
period.68
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Leadership and Education.
Understanding the complexities of conducting
stability operations must remain a core component of
Army leadership training and education. The doctrine
is not worth the paper it is written on if the Army fails
to ensure that counterinsurgency warfare holds an
equal position in the Army’s leadership training centers. If the Army leadership expects new junior leaders
to take this complex form of conflict seriously, counterinsurgency strategy must not be relegated back to a
mere 3-day block of instruction out of a 6-month leader
training curriculum. In recent years, the Basic Officer
Leadership Course and Captain’s Career Course have
both placed counterinsurgency doctrine on a much
higher footing in the curriculum—rightly so, but out
of the necessity of the wars in which the Army is embroiled. A return to steady-state operations with the
end of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could lead
some to advocate a return to a focus on conventional
warfare to the exclusion of stability operations. The
institutional Army should prevent this from happening. The curriculums of officer and noncommissioned
officer (NCO) developmental courses must address
counterinsurgency doctrine and stability operations
as they apply to the level of leadership being trained.
Fundamentals of the doctrine should be taught at all
levels facilitating emphasis on the nature of counterinsurgency warfare and the lessons hard-earned in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Likewise, there are countless other
equally important lessons to be retained from U.S.
operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Philippines and from other stability operations conducted
over the last 2 decades. These lessons, focused on by
the “schoolhouse,” should not be those characteristics
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unique to the enemies faced in these wars but should
stress the basics—to protect the population, understand the operating environment, attack the root
causes of the insurgency, and seek a whole of government approach to achieve victory, to name a few.
The leadership and educational training apparatus
of the institutional Army must seek greater opportunities to train the officer and NCO corps to be agile,
creative, and resourceful leaders capable of responding under pressure. If Operations IRAQI FREEDOM
and ENDURING FREEDOM taught the Army nothing else, it taught that agile, adaptive, and thinking
junior leaders were vital to success on the battlefield.
The institutions designed for training junior leaders
from the Warrior Leadership Course to the Captain’s
Career Course must seek opportunities to challenge
their students in ambiguous, uncertain, and challenging environments to both build agility and instill confidence.69
The importance of understanding and considering
second- and third-order effects by the Army’s junior
leaders cannot be over-emphasized. In addition to agile thinking and adaptability in an ambiguous environment, junior leaders in the Army today must have
a greater understanding of the world around them.
“The operating environment has changed and with
it new and evolving technologies have emerged . . .
curriculums should cover subjects like counter IED,
battle command networks, power and energy, robotics, joint enablers, and the human dimension.”70 The
educational institutions must be future scanning organizations that look not just to the past and present
but must also strive to anticipate the likely threats and
to constantly adapt the curriculum to areas of likely
threats. With the implementation of the regionally
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aligned brigades with ASCCs, the leader development
institutions could bring subject matter experts to the
schoolhouses to familiarize their students on the likely threats they will face when they return to their units
and deploy on contingency operations. Though this
was easier done recently as the Army has been more
focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, this is nonetheless
equally important to sustain in the future when the
Army returns to steady-state operations. Leader development institutions should place greater emphasis
on cultural awareness as well as negotiation skills.
They must likewise work to overcome the biases in
the Army toward other agencies of the government as
the whole of government approach to defeating insurgencies remains pivotal to success.
There will be a natural tendency to hone in on conventional warfare—a return to pre-war normal, and
to eschew the counterinsurgency wars fought over the
last decade. Integration of stability operations lessons
as an essential component of leadership training holds
the best chance for preventing this tendency. As David Ucko asserted:
The counterinsurgency community advances a cause
that is anathematic to the traditional American way
of war. . .the use of force in counterinsurgency campaigns cannot be overwhelming; victory—where
achieved—is ambiguous rather than decisive; the winning formula is low-tech and high-risk and casualties
must be expected as part of a long-haul effort likely to
span years if not decades.71

Understanding the different characteristics and
strategies for combating adversaries along the full
spectrum of warfare must be a critical component
of every level of the Army’s leadership training
institutions.
47

The Army prides itself on having multi-functional,
capable and adaptive Soldiers. Though the Army benefits from the specialization of skills, the counterinsurgency environment has decidedly leveled the playing
field. Whereas the linear nature of the conventional
battlefield makes it less likely that rear echelon personnel will need to be familiar with the combat functions of front line troops, the nonlinear, noncontiguous nature of the counterinsurgency battlefield makes
it critical that all personnel have a better background
and training in counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine. In addition, the reality of the counterinsurgency
battlefield is that even the smallest actions or inactions
of individual Soldiers can have grave consequences to
the overall chances of victory. The Soldiers responsible for the gross negligence and misconduct at Abu
Ghraib failed to consider the second- and third-order
effects of their actions to the total war effort. Their
actions, more so than anything else, contributed significantly to the swelling of the insurgent’s ranks in
2004 and 2005. Concerted efforts must continue to be
made, through training in the institutional Army, to
educate Soldiers on how their actions can have grave
consequences on their fellow Soldiers—countless
Americans died as a result of the virulent attacks perpetrated by those incensed by the human rights violations of Abu Ghraib.
Personnel.
The Army, at every level, tends to seek more personnel to meet the growing demands of a complex environment. The U.S. military remains the best manned,
best resourced, and best trained force in the world
and receives a sizeable portion of the government’s
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budgetary spending. Rarely will one find agencies or
units in the military asking to be downsized, but with
personnel costs contributing to almost a quarter of the
defense budget and the rising costs of military pensions, requests for additional personnel are unlikely
to be met with a favorable response.72 Fundamentally, the Army must find ways to do more with what
it has and should anticipate significant end strength
reductions. A reduction of the active component end
strength from 570,000 to 490,000 is already underway
as announced by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
January 5, 2012, and elaborated on by General Raymond Odierno on January 27, 2012.73 Reductions to
meet the already directed $487 billion budgetary cuts
in the Defense budget over the next decade necessitate
tough decisions in a resource constrained world.74 Sequestration could also lead to significantly more cuts
if bipartisan compromise is not reached over the next
year. Consequently, this paper will refrain from flying
in the face of current trends but does suggest greater
generalization of some functions to create capacity
for needed subject matter expertise to better enable
the force to fight and win across the full spectrum of
conflict. The institutional Army should undertake an
exhaustive search for redundancy in its personnel and
should seek to eliminate these overlaps where possible.
In addition, there are military occupational specialties (MOS) currently assigned to MTO&Es that have
mission profiles uniquely tailored to major combat
operations with limited applicability in stability operations. As alluded to above in the discussion on organizational transformation, some of these MOSs which
have limited roles in major combat operations could
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be “dual hatted” for missions in stability environments in order to reduce the need for adding personnel when the Army is already facing an 80,000 troop
reduction. For instance, chemical personnel have been
trained for years in preparation of Unit Status Reports
(USR) because battalion chemical officers and chemical NCOs habitually were assigned this additional
duty. Similarly, in lieu of seeking to add personnel to
gain the subject matter expertise needed to conduct
economic development, the institutional Army should
review and consider certifying those MOSs that have
more limited roles in stability operations with additional skill identifiers to be better prepared for civil
capacity development, economic development, and
host nation security forces training. Fire direction officers and NCOs over the last decade have routinely
assumed electronic warfare duties and received training stateside before deploying to be better prepared to
perform these duties. If these critical skills needed for
IED defeat and nation-building are not to be added
to the Brigade and Battalion MTO&E, then additional
ASIs and additional duties need to be codified in the
MTO&E to ensure that the Army retains these vital
skill sets. In this age of defense budget cuts, the Army
must learn from its business brethren and seek to find
greater efficiency and savings in order to ensure that
it can fence resources needed to maintain the balance
between end strength, force modernization and readiness.75
If the room for slight increases in manpower existed after prudent cost cutting measures across the
board, the personnel function most lacking in the
fielded forces that merits change lies in the lack of a
trained and capable section at the battalion and brigade level to facilitate and enable interagency train-
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ing. Too often these roles are passed on to a junior- or
mid-grade officer and a “pick-up” team of Soldiers to
work with and facilitate the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, nongovernmental organizations, or other international governmental organizations (IGOs). Few
of these ad hoc teams were ever prepared for these
daunting responsibilities. If the Army truly desires a
greater whole of government approach to prosecuting
and winning a counterinsurgency campaign, there
must be efforts to create greater subject matter expertise in cooperation with these other agencies. Expertise
in advancing rule of law and judicial responsibility,
professionalization of partnered police and border enforcement forces, expertise in civil capacity development at the local through provincial level, proficiency
in economic development capacity and in creating an
environment for development of essential services are
all needed at the brigade level at the very least and
optimally down to the battalion level. At this point,
such growth in personnel at the tactical level remains
unlikely but should be remembered as opportunities
arise at a later date or if the concept of “reversibility”
is necessitated.
Facilities.
Equally constrained by budgetary cuts will be any
significant expansion of existing facilities. Though
military construction only constituted 3.1 percent of
the defense budget last year, it has been on the rise
over the last decade but will likely see decreases in
the years ahead.76 Consequently, a recommendation
to create a new CTC that caters to stability operations
training or significant facilities development to enable
home station training will likely meet stiff resistance.
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The Army will need to do more with what it already
has. Efforts to keep the force trained and ready for
counterinsurgency operations will likely necessitate
greater reliance on simulations as a means to reduce
costs associated with live training. An exportable
training package capable of moving from home station to home station much like the MRAP and Route
Reconnaissance/Clearance Operations (R2C2) trainers developed and used in recent years could provide
the simulations venue needed for this training shortfall while keeping costs relatively low.
In addition, one of the most significant challenges
to getting civilian subject matter experts from other
governmental agencies to join the Army in training
for contingency operations is their lack of opportunity. Department of State personnel already operate at
a distinctly high OPTEMPO spending years at a time
overseas in positions in U.S. embassies only to return
to Washington, DC, for an equally high-paced lifestyle
with many demands on their time. Making time to join
brigades training for counterinsurgency operations, in
order to ensure greater civil-military integration will
remain difficult at best. The development of a virtual
civil-military training center could facilitate cooperation and relationship development that would better
enable a whole of government approach in deployed
environments.
Finally, facilities already best suited for the live
training which is vital to success on any battlefield
must be invested in and maintained. The CTCs offer
some of the best training available anywhere in the
world and greatly enabled the Army’s successful stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These CTCs
cannot and should not become sacrificial lambs for
budgetary cutbacks or readiness of the force and the
feasibility of “reversibility” will suffer.
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CONCLUSION
A common thread runs through most of these
recommendations that the Army must never again
approach counterinsurgency, and associated nationbuilding, without a whole of government approach.
Well-documented in academic writing, success in the
counterinsurgency fight in Iraq necessitated civil-military cooperation at all levels to achieve the complementary effects of bringing all of the instruments of
national power to defeat an insurgency. The Army
may not be able to directly affect change in all federal
agencies to ensure a whole of government approach
in future stability operations but it can condition the
profession of arms to understand the indispensability
of approaching counterinsurgency strategy with an
eye to a whole of government approach and to applying all of the instruments of national power to win
on the ground. Such efforts at the outset will shorten
the overall length of any conflict, thus increasing the
probability of success and reducing the probability of
another protracted war for which the American people lack political will and cannot afford, and which
burdens the military with an OPTEMPO which it cannot sustain, especially with decreasing end strength.
The economic recession and concomitant federal
budget cuts will drive the military to belt-tightening
measures in the years ahead. However, it would be
irresponsible to repeat the mistakes of the past by ignoring the lessons learned and the adaptations that
were derived from the successful counterinsurgency
strategy in Iraq. A scan of future conflict facing the
Army yields ambiguous results—one cannot predict
the exact nature of America’s future fights but the
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Army does have a responsibility to the American people to be prepared for the likelihood of hybrid threats
while remaining trained and ready to fight and win
on the conventional battlefield to defeat existential
threats. These obligations require that the Army address institutional changes to better prepare the force
to fight and win counterinsurgency warfare while still
remaining capable at major combat operations.
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the need for development of the officer corps in the Army, the text
continues saying:
Each author approaches future officer development in a different way, but all arrive at similar, though not identical, conclusions regarding the importance of providing a broader range
of educational and professional experiences—essential components of training agile minds how to think rather than what to
think—and cultivating new skill sets that are more relevant to
the contemporary strategic environment. Dr. Don M. Snider, an
expert on military professionalism at the U.S. Army War College, emphasizes the importance of cultivating the officer corps
as an expert profession which requires the possession of specialized knowledge on the use of military force. Thus, personnel policy, training, and education must preserve core professional competencies, but also develop a progressively deeper
under-standing of war and strategy. Frank Hoffman establishes
a framework for how to think about the requirements for officership in a rapidly changing threat environment marked by
‘complex irregular warfare’ or ‘hybrid war.’ He identifies six
primary ‘leadership lines of operation’ that must be pursued
in order to reach a ’full-spectrum profession’ of military officership: professional rigor, operational focus, ethical sensitivity, situational intelligence, orientation to national rather than
parochial needs, and continuous learning. This framework is
useful in highlighting an overall strategy to achieve the goal of
an officer corps that can adapt to changing circumstances while
maintaining core competencies.

There is much more in this text but these two chapters complement the recommendations found in this paper. Anyone seeking to understand current thought on how to promote agility and
adaptability in the Army officer corps would do well to read this
seminal text.
70. Vane, p. 34.
71. Ucko, p. 301.
72. Office of Management and Budget, “Outlays by Function
and Subfunction: 1962-2016,” available from www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/budget/Historicals.
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73. For details of President Barak Obama, Secretary Leon
Panetta, and General Martin Dempsey’s press conference on the
defense strategy given on January 5, 2011, see Lisa Daniel, “Guidance Guards Against All Threats Officials Say,” January 5, 2012,
available from www.defense.gov/ news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66688;
General Raymond T. Odierno, “Budget Impact to the Army Briefing at the Pentagon,” in a press conference on the impacts to
the Army from budget cuts given on January 27, 2012, available
from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4964.
More detailed numbers and strategies for how this end strength
reduction applies to the U.S. Army were elaborated on by Chief
of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno in his January
27 press conference. Emphasizing responsible and balanced approaches to drawdown, General Odierno stated:
Over the last 5 years, we grew the Army to meet the requirements associated with large-scale combat and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the successful completion
of our mission in Iraq, the continued transition of operations
to Afghan security forces and the reduction of U.S. presence
in Afghanistan, our strategy calls for us to no longer plan for
large-scale stability operations. Accordingly, the time is strategically right to reduce the Army’s force structure. Even given
a fiscally constrained environment, our Army will accomplish
our reductions in a responsible and controlled manner. Secretary McHugh and I are committed to ensuring we walk down
this hill at the ready rather than running our nation’s Army
off a cliff. We will reduce our active force end strength from
570,000 to 490,000, which will include a reduction of at least
eight brigade combat teams. It is important to note, however,
that an Army of 490,000 in 2017 will be fundamentally different
and more capable than the Army of 482,000 that we had in 2001.

74. David Alexander and Jim Wolf, “Military Budget Cuts:
Pentagon Unveils 2013 Plan,” available from www.huffingtonpost.
com/2012/01/26/military-budget-cuts-pentagon_n_1234761.html.
75. Odierno. In keeping with the consistent theme in public
speaking engagements, the Army Chief of Staff emphasized that
the drawdown in forces had to be balanced and controlled. In his
statement to the press on January 27, 2012, on the subject of the
impact of budget cuts on the Army posture, he stated, “Our approach to the current future budget cycles will remain strategy-
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based and fiscally prudent. Adjustments will come through deliberately balancing three rheostats: the first piece consisting of
end-strength force structure and personnel; second, modernization; and third, readiness.” No matter what the changes to force
structure are, senior Army leadership agrees that the Army must
remain a capable force to do our nation’s bidding. General Odierno went on to say:
We prevent conflict. We do this by maintaining credibility
based on the Army’s capacity, its readiness and modernization to prevent miscalculation by potential adversaries. Moreover, the Army has a critical role in shaping the environment
by supporting Combatant Commanders and sustaining strong
military relations with allies, building the capacity of partners
to maintain internal and regional stability and operating alongside our joint forces to facilitate access around the world. And
we stand ready to win our nation’s wars when needed. If all
else fails, the Army will always be ready to rapidly apply its
combined arms capabilities to dominate any environment and
win decisively as part of the Joint Force. As we look ahead,
the Secretary and I have several priorities. Foremost, we will
provide trained, equipped and ready forces to win the current
fight. Second, we will develop the Army for the future as part of
Joint Force 2020, a versatile mix of capabilities, formations and
equipment. We must sustain our high-quality, all-volunteer
Army.

76. “Outlays by Function and Subfunction.”
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